about how they were going to vote in the independence referendum, the main challenge for the 'Yes Scotland' campaign would be to rally the undecideds: ' 'Yes Scotland', therefore, needed to capture the imagination of Scottish voters in a way that the National Conversation on the future of Scotland initiated by the first SNP Government in 2007 had not. 6 In its second White Paper on the constitutional future of Scotland, 'Your Scotland Your Voice', published in 2009, the Scottish Government congratulated itself on the National Conversation being 'a unique programme of engagement with the Scottish public'. Yet its own official figures 7 could hardly be seen as evidence that the objective of securing the 'fullest participation possible' set in the first White Paper, ' Choosing Scotland's Future: A National Conversation', had been met. 8 
5
The 1997 referendum was an obvious model for the Scottish Government, coming after the victory at the British general election of a party -Labour -which had committed itself in its election manifesto to a referendum on devolution. The devolution referendum had indeed given the Labour Government a clear mandate to proceed with its devolution plans. In 1997, however, the Labour Government could rely on the support of the other two parties in favour of constitutional reform, namely the Liberal Democrats and the SNP, all three parties campaigning alongside each other for a double 'Yes' vote 9 in the crossparty campaign 'Scotland FORward'. The three parties together commanded between two thirds and three quarters of the votes at every general election in Scotland from 1979 to 1992 and had won 80% of the votes in 1997. Besides, as opinion polls showed, the political consensus in favour of devolution was embraced by a large majority of the people of Scotland. By contrast, by the time the SNP won its first Scottish Parliament election and formed a minority government in 2007, though there was a cross-party consensus on Scotland's constitutional future in the Scottish Parliament, it was against full independence. In fact, until 2007 there were two pro-independence parties other than the SNP represented in the Scottish Parliament, namely the Scottish Green Party and the Scottish Socialist Party, with respectively six and seven MSPs elected in 2003, but at the 2007 and 2011 Scottish Parliament elections, the Scottish Green Party only had two candidates elected -both on regional lists -while the Scottish Socialist Party did not manage to win a single seat. Besides, even after the SNP's historical victory in 2011, when the party won an overall majority of seats in the Scottish Parliament and won the election in 53 of the 73 constituencies, support for independence did not make any progress. As shown in the Scottish Social Attitudes surveys, a majority of people in Scotland were in favour of the powers of the Scottish Parliament being extended, but when it came to constitutional preferences they still opted for further devolution rather than complete independence. When the 'Yes Scotland' campaign was launched in the spring of 2012, therefore, victory seemed to be well beyond the reach of the three pro-independence parties. In actual fact, the target of 1million signatures to the 'Independence for Scotland' declaration was reached three and a half weeks before Referendum Day, on 22 August, but although the 'Yes' campaign gathered momentum in the last weeks of the official campaign and all the opinion polls showed the gap between the 'No' votes and the 'Yes' votes narrowing dramatically, the Scottish Government fell short of reaching the 50% needed to win the case for independence. On an exceptionally high turnout -84% of the registered voters -55.3% said 'No' to Scotland becoming an independent country. Yet, in spite of the claims made by the leaders of the 'Better Together' campaign that the outcome of the referendum had settled the question of Scotland's independence once and for all, and while the Prime Minister announced on the day following the referendum the setting-up of an all-party commission chaired by Lord Smith and assigned the task of producing a set of proposals for more devolution by St Andrew's Day 11 , the proindependence movement has not died down -quite the reverse. One may wonder therefore to what extent 'Yes Scotland' could be seen as having laid the foundations for a national movement for independence.
9
Alex Salmond received most of the attention of the media in its coverage of the 'Yes Scotland' campaign from its launch in 2012 through to the final days of the official campaign. 12 Yet, although the First Minister remained throughout 'the public face of the independence campaign', as David Torrance puts it, 13 in the last weeks of a campaign in which the pro-independence parties had to come to terms with a generally hostile media, the Scottish Green leader established himself more firmly in the party political campaign promoting his own vision of an independent Scotland. In actual fact, however, there were two campaigns developing in parallel, a campaign in the media which to a large extent was dominated by the SNP and a campaign on the ground, which involved a number of extra-parliamentary groups set up in the wake of the 2011 SNP election victory with a view to engaging people in the debate on what kind of society they wanted Scotland to be.
The SNP-led campaign 10 Great care was taken early on to make of 'Yes Scotland' an umbrella group rallying political parties, non-party organisations as well as individuals supporting independence, rather than a one-party campaign. A few weeks after the launch, Blair Jenkins, former head of news for both BBC Scotland and STV, was appointed as Chief Executive of 'Yes Scotland', 14 and in August 2012 an advisory board of 10 members was appointed, half of whom were non-party political appointments. 15 The composition of the board, chaired by former Labour MP and thereafter Independent MSP Dennis Canavan, scrupulously respected parity between men and women. Among its political appointments were the Deputy First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, the co-convener of the Scottish Green Party, Patrick Harvie and the convener of the Scottish Socialist Party, Colin Fox. 11 Yet, just as the 'ScotlandFORward' campaign in 1997 had borne the mark of the Labour Party, regardless of the fact that both the Liberal Democrats and the SNP threw their weight behind a double 'Yes' vote, for the obvious reason that it was Labour in government in London which had decided to hold a referendum on devolution in the first place, the 'Yes Scotland' campaign was bound to bear the mark of the SNP. It was the SNP government which entered into negotiations with the British government over the right for the Scottish Government to hold a referendum on independence. It was Alex Salmond, as First Minister of Scotland, who signed the Edinburgh Agreement with the British Government on 15 October 2012 which, among other things, provided that the British Parliament would transfer to Holyrood the power to hold a referendum on independence before the end of 2014. And it was the Scottish Government which introduced legislation aimed at organising the referendum before the Scottish Parliament. published a White Paper, Scotland's Future -Your Guide to an Independent Scotland, which was unveiled by the First Minister on 25 November 2013. In this case, however, not only did the White Paper make the case for independence but it also revealed in detail a number of policies which the SNP pledged to implement if it won the first general election in an independent Scotland. And although the White Paper did explain the difference between devolution and independence, and highlighted the gains from independence 'whichever party is elected ', 18 there was no doubt as to the fact that it was above all a policy document and looked very much like an election manifesto, unlike the British Government's 1997 White Paper on devolution which did not mention policies. 13 The SNP undoubtedly took advantage of its position as the governing party to rally people behind a 'Yes' vote thereby making the 'Yes' campaign appear very much as an SNP-led campaign. The Scottish all-women Cabinet chaired by Nicola Sturgeon in Edinburgh on 9 June 2014 is a case in point. Both the format of the Cabinet meeting, which included women from 130 organisations across Scotland, and the issues discussed on that occasion, whether it was the Government's commitment to free universal childcare for children aged 1 to 5 19 or its proposal to raise the minimum wage, 20 were clearly targeted at women, whom opinion polls had identified as being more reluctant to vote 'Yes' in the referendum. Indeed such events enabled the SNP to campaign for a 'Yes' vote while building on their record in government. 21 14 In many instances, therefore, the leadership of the SNP -whether Alex Salmond or Nicola Sturgeon -seemed to be campaigning for the first election in an independent Scotland as much as for a 'Yes' vote in the referendum. Nowhere was this more evident than in the televised debates between Alex Salmond and Alistair Darling in August 2014, 22 modeled on the leaders' debates first held in Britain during the 2010 general election campaign, and also held in Scotland in the run-up to the 2011 Scottish Parliament election. These two leaders' debates gave a presidential tone to the campaign, turning it into an election campaign in which voters were asked to choose between two parties to govern Scotland. This was inappropriate of course, but it was also hazardous, especially for the 'Yes' campaign as the message sent to the people was that a 'Yes' vote meant a vote for Alex Salmond.
Salmond's personality, the three most chosen adjectives were arrogant (54.6%), ambitious (51.9%) and dishonest (29.2%). 25 17 Besides, in the context of the 2011 Scottish Parliament election, the SNP leader had made the most of scoring political points during the leaders' debates by underlining his party's credentials as the most able party to defend the interests of Scotland within the United Kingdom and above all pressing his positive vision of the future against the negativity of his opponents. But this time the leaders' debates were at best a zero-sum game, since Alistair Darling outperformed Alex Salmond in the first debate, as Alex Salmond himself admitted afterwards, while the second debate turned to his own advantage.
18 Unsurprisingly therefore, the media coverage of the 'Yes' campaign focused very much on the SNP's proposals more than on independence as one constitutional option among others for the future of Scotland.
Coming to terms with a generally hostile media 19 The conventional media in Scotland was overwhelmingly opposed to independence. With the exception of the Sunday Herald, which called for a 'Yes' vote, all other Scottish newspapers -or Scottish editions -at best tried to present the two sides of the case, as did the Herald, but mostly defended the Union. Although some may at times have been critical of the strategy developed by the 'Better Together' campaign, all in all they had a definite bias against the 'Yes Scotland' campaign, and especially against the party seen as leading it, namely the SNP.
Exchequer, ruled out a currency union between an independent Scotland and the rest of the UK, and was almost immediately backed by the Labour and the Liberal Democrat leaders, Alex Salmond was immediately pressed by the media to spell out his Plan B.
Beside putting the SNP on the defensive, such pressure also brought to the fore dissensions within the 'Yes' campaign over the currency issue, between supporters of the Scottish Government's strategy of negotiating a currency union and advocates of a separate Scottish currency, among whom Patrick Harvie, but also Dennis Canavan, Jim Sillars and Colin Fox. Therefore although the idea of a currency union was strictly speaking what the SNP favoured, not what all the supporters of independence advocated, the decision by the three pro-Union parties to rule out a currency union was presented as exposing the weakness of the entire 'Yes' Campaign in a way that the differences between the proposals for further devolution to the Scottish Parliament made by the three proUnion parties were never presented in the media as a weakness of the 'No' campaign.
23 In many ways, therefore, the 'Yes' campaign was presented in the media above all as a campaign led by the Scottish Government; consequently, the referendum was presented as a choice between accepting and refusing the political programme which an SNP Government would implement in an independent Scotland rather than as a choice between a devolved Parliament, possibly including an extension of its powers, and a fully independent Parliament.
24 Yet after the second leaders' debate on 25 August, as the 'Yes' vote started gathering momentum, 27 a series of more conventional panel-based debates gave the Scottish Green Party co-convener, Patrick Harvie, the opportunity to voice his party's vision of an independent Scotland, which differed on some points from the vision expressed by the SNP, while also strongly making the case for a 'Yes' vote. In this regard, the second debate organised by STV on 2 September in Edinburgh, where he represented 'Yes Scotland' alongside the Deputy First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, was emblematic of a new confidence and maturity in the 'Yes' camp. What came out of this debate first of all was that the two politicians campaigning for a 'Yes' vote were taking part in the debate on equal terms. In actual fact, not only did Patrick Harvie press his vision of an independent Scotland, but he had no qualms about expressing the divergences of opinion between his party and the SNP on some issues. Indeed he used these differences to make the point that the referendum was not a vote about getting Alex Salmond in or out of government, which, he argued, made the case for voting 'Yes' in the referendum even stronger. 25 In the same way, in the debate organised by the Herald in Glasgow on 4 September ,28 the Green leader distanced himself from the SNP on the issue of oil, underlining the urgency in opting for renewable alternatives to fossil fuel energy. In fact he described oil as 'an asset but also a threat' and explained that although the Greens supported the removal of the Trident submarines from the Clyde estuary, they did not want to see nuclear submarines replaced with oil extraction off the west coast of Scotland. Patrick Harvie was also comfortable with highlighting the fact that the Green Party was in favour of an elected head of state, just as it did not want an independent Scotland to apply for membership of NATO. 26 In the end, the SNP, which had every legitimacy to set the agenda in the 'Yes' campaign being the party in government which had initiated the referendum, found itself constrained to some extent by its belief that the positivity of the message delivered by 'Yes Scotland' was what would win the case for independence. Building on the strategy it had developed during the 2011 Scottish Parliament election campaign, the SNP was determined to present a 'narrative of hope' to oppose to the negativity of the case made by the 'Better Together' campaign. Consequently, much stress was laid on the idea that the people who lived in Scotland were the best placed to make decisions affecting Scotland and that independence offered enormous opportunities in terms of economic prosperity and social justice, 29 more than on a condemnation of the Westminster government.
27 As a result, the 'Yes' campaign faced a dilemma: the message had to be a positive message, but it also needed to appeal to people inclined to vote 'Yes' not so much because they adhered to the narrative presented by the SNP as because they felt that a 'No' vote meant approving the Westminster set-up. In other words, it needed to make sure that people inclined to say 'No' to the status quo could be persuaded to say 'Yes' to independence. And in spite of all the efforts made by the 'Yes' campaigners on the ground to show that a 'Yes' vote was not a vote for the SNP, this is what came out in the media.
28 In this regard, the campaign on the ground differed in many ways from the media campaign as it aimed at building on people's hostility to the Westminster political set-up, and more widely to the neo-liberal consensus in place at Westminster.
The national movement behind 'Yes Scotland': a front against the neoliberal consensus at Westminster 29 The 'Yes Scotland' campaign was remarkable in that it succeeded in engaging people in the debate about what kind of society they wanted Scotland to be, thanks, to a large extent, to the involvement of extra-parliamentary groups campaigning on the ground alongside party activists for a 'Yes' vote. These groups emerged within the left movement in Scotland, and positioned themselves firmly to the left of the Scottish Labour Party. In this regard, the profusion of publications centring on the potential for change in an independent Scotland bears witness both to the dynamism of the left movement and to the willingness to initiate a debate not so much on arguments in favour or against independence, as on different models of society. by providing a platform for individuals and local groups in the independence movement. People were therefore invited to participate in a variety of events, from debates and talks to cultural showcases and 'pop-up gigs', as well as sending their own contributions -visual or otherwise -to the National Collective website.
by organising or taking part among other things in public meetings and street stalls. The 'Radical Independence Campaign' launched in Glasgow in November 2012 gathered trade unionists, socialists, environmentalists and anti-poverty campaigners whose objective was to promote a radical, progressive vision of Scotland. 'Women for Independence' was launched in September 2012 with a view to pursuing the work of the women's groups which in the 1990s had actively campaigned for equal representation of women in the new Scottish Parliament. 32 'Common Weal' started as the flagship project of the Jimmy Reid Foundation in June 2013 which invited people to submit ideas about how to build a better, fairer society in an independent Scotland, and it became a separate organisation at the beginning of August 2014. 32 The message they wanted to get across to the people in the run-up to and during the referendum campaign was that independence was not an end in itself, but rather it was an opportunity to reform and radically change Scottish society so as to establish a truly social democracy. chose to stay in the United Kingdom, in an attempt at making the Scots feel less attached to the Union. Instead of presenting the prospect of an independent Scotland exclusively in terms of opportunities offered which would guarantee economic prosperity and social justice, as the Scottish Government tended to do when it insisted on delivering a 'narrative of hope' to counterbalance the negativity of the 'Better Together' campaign, it was equally important to underline the fact that a 'No' vote meant more austerity and more cuts in public services. In actual fact, this is a point which the 'Radical Independence Campaign', as well as 'Women for Independence' and 'Common Weal' tried 'Yes Scotland': More than a Party Political Campaign, a National Movement Fos...
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to address in the public meetings and events they organized or took part in, thereby trying to expose the promises for further devolution made by the pro-Union parties as being aimed at legitimizing the Westminster model of government.
36 What also made the campaign on the ground particularly invigorating and dynamic was the fact that it combined conventional ways of campaigning, such as leafleting and canvassing on the doorsteps, as well as traditional forms of citizen engagement through the town hall meetings, with the tools of modern technology. This undoubtedly contributed to the sense of massive citizen engagement generated by 'Yes Scotland'. To take one example, National Collective launched a Twitter hashtag called '#YesBecause' which encouraged people to declare themselves for independence, and which could be used to a certain extent as a new kind of canvassing. Besides, the 'Yes' campaign also had its own media in the form of the online newspaper and website Bella Caledonia, which published articles aimed at balancing the bias of the conventional media against independence. 41 Likewise, during the Edinburgh Festival, a new online television channel appeared on the Internet which called itself Referendum TV. It was created and run by volunteers who felt that the mainstream media were not telling the whole story in the referendum debate, and that the mainstream broadcast media, and the BBC in particular, could not be trusted to tell the truth in spite of its neutrality obligation. Among the programmes webcast during the campaign, mostly in August, were face-to-face interviews as well as informal debates with a variety of guests from all walks of life, not all of them in favour of a Yes vote.
42
37 When it comes to assessing the potential impact modern technologies and in particular the social media may have had on the campaign, caution is required, however. Research carried out by Mark Shepard and Stephen Quinlan on the role of the social media in the referendum campaign over a period of one year from mid-August 2013 to the referendum has established that, although online activity increased considerably on both sides of the debate, especially in the last three weeks of the campaign, 'Yes Scotland' had won the social media campaign in terms of the number of followers on its Twitter account, of the number of likes on its Facebook page as well as of the number of comments posted on it. Yet, although 'Yes Scotland' generated greater enthusiasm online than its rival, this was not reflected in the polls 43 which still showed the 'No' vote as being ahead of the 'Yes' vote. According to Stephen Quinlan, this could be explained by the fact that 'the social media world is one where the committed interact with each other rather than one where converts are made'. 44 Indeed, the first poll carried out by TNS after the referendum, in mid-October, confirmed that caution was required when trying to assess the influence the social media may have had on the outcome of the referendum: it showed indeed that only a small percentage of people had contributed to an online discussion (11%) compared to the proportion of people who had watched television -60% of the people interviewed had watched one of the two television debates -or talked about the referendum with their friends and family (62%). 40 The percentage of 'Yes' votes in the referendum -44.7% -could therefore be indicative of a breakthrough in the building up of a national movement for independence. In any case, the fact that, within a couple of weeks of the referendum, the membership of the SNP and that of the Scottish Green Party tripled to reach 75,000 and 6,000 respectively, while the Scottish Socialist Party also registered an increase in membership, is evidence that the referendum has not settled the question of Scotland's independence. The membership figures unveiled by both parties at the end of the year 2014 -over 93,000 members for the SNP 46 and 7,500 for the Scottish Green Party 47 -confirm that the independence movement has not lost momentum in the wake of the referendum.
41 As a matter of fact, just over four months after the referendum, the 'Radical Independence Campaign', 'Women for Independence' and 'Common Weal' have already set themselves further objectives: the 'Radical Independence Campaign', in a postreferendum statement issued on 27 September and entitled 'Moving Forward', pledged to 'act as a broad movement for change that continues to promote the idea that another Scotland is possible' 48 and has committed itself to continuing to work with the independence movement. 'Women for Independence' have decided to turn their campaign into a formal organization and will hold their first AGM on 14 March 2015. Meanwhile 'Common Weal' is looking ahead to the forthcoming 2015 general election campaign and has launched its 'red lines campaign' aimed at encouraging people to vote for small parties which in the context of a 'hung' parliament could hold the London government to account. Parliament within the framework of the United Kingdom. Although the number of signatories has been disputed, some estimates putting that number at over two million people, bearing in mind that the population of Scotland was around 5.1 million according to the 1951 census, it was undeniably successful as a mass petition albeit one which had little political impact .
3. The date of the referendum had not been set yet. On 10 January 2012, the British Government launched a consultation on handing temporary powers to the Scottish Parliament to organise a referendum on independence, the preferred date for the British Government being 2013. The following day, however, Alex Salmond announced that his preferred date was the autumn of 2014. 7. SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT, Your Scotland, Your Voice, November 2009, pp.5-6. The Government claimed that more than 15,000 people had engaged in the National Conversation overall over the two-year period: over 5,300 people had attended more than 50 National Conversation events, more than 6,500 people had attended 130 economy-based sessions, and almost 5,000 people had posted comments on National Conversation blogs. As for the National Conversation website it had received 500,000 hits. 
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Two questions were put to the people of Scotland in the referendum, the first on whether they agreed that Scotland should have a devolved parliament and the second on whether they agreed that the Scottish Parliament should be granted tax-varying powers. 
